Back at the helm of NASA’s space sciences division is Ed Weiler, a Chicago boy who went to Northwestern to get a degree in astrophysics. He’s a familiar face around the agency, back at a job he held a decade ago. In between, he oversaw NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, where all kinds of astronomical machines are created. Before that, Weiler was lead scientist for the Hubble observatory.
It was in that role that Weiler first came into prominence, a blue-eyed, sandy-haired straight-talker explaining to folks how the cornerstone of NASA’s Great Observatories program came to be launched with a misshaped main mirror.
“Now I talk to people from generation Y or X who don’t remember Hubble had a problem,” says Weiler. “We’ve gone far enough now that people forget.”
Once nice thing about leaving some tread on the road is you know where you’ve been and, if you’re lucky, you have a pretty good idea of where you’re going.
We’re sitting outside on an unseasonably cool day at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif. “The cold doesn’t bother me,” Weiler offers as I steer him away from the noise and distractions of the JPL newsroom. “I grew up in Chicago.”
It’s almost a brag, how Windy City winters prepare you to stare cold in the face. Even in southern California, where the temperature was 85-plus a few days ago. Now it’s in the 50s, just like NASA, just like Ed and just like I’ll be someday in the not too-distant future. In our culture it’s easy to forget that getting older is what we hope for.
It’s hopping around here today, the day before Phoenix lands on Mars. It’ll be the first time water from another planet is sampled -- if it works. Weiler was in charge when the last lander failed and he’s been talking up the grim Mars stats ever since he’s back in the limelight as NASA’s top space science guy.
Weiler likes a good come-back story, like Hubble’s. For you young-bloods, the telescope was outfitted with corrective optics by a space shuttle crew and went on to deliver paradigm-shifting insights into the nature of the universe, such as the fact that it’s growing even faster now than it was in its youth. I feel like that’s true in life as well.
At 59 and with 30 years of government service on his resume, Weiler could have retired by now. Except for one thing: He feels the best days are yet to come.
“I got excited by the moon program and by the Mercury and Gemini flights because I had this dream as a kid that NASA would be going to Mars and to the stars someday. I still believe that humans will travel in space. It’s our nature to explore and I still think that’s in our future. I think it’s going to be more spread out with other countries involved, but that’s still in front of us.
“I’m also convinced that it will be in this century , the 21st century -- and I’m absolutely convinced of this, maybe not while I’m still alive, or you perhaps, but sometime in this century -- we will have the technology to build and launch a telescope (perhaps humans will have to construct it in space because it’s very large) that has the ability to search the atmospheres of other planets around other stars and to find those telltale traces of life around another planet: methane, carbon dioxide , the oxygen ,the water vapor. We find those elements in an atmosphere and we’ve proven that we are not alone. There’s life out there. That only happens once in human history -- once -- to answer that age-old question. That will have profound philosophical effects on the human race. And we will have that technology in this century.
“So yeah, I there’s a future out there,” he says. And with dramatic flair, drops the clincher: “Will we have the will to grasp it?”
June 6, 2008
Why Enterprise Never Went Into Space
by Vincent A. Weldon, Aerospace Bachelor and Master of Science Engineer
Before addressing Enterprise it is helpful to understand two prior experiences that helped me to raise the issue that answers the above question.
In 1960, I was assigned to help design the revolutionary wing trailing edge triple- slotted flap system for Boeing's first highly successful commercial jetliner, the 727, then in development (the 707 was less successful, mainly because of its more numerous variants and fewer sales).
Overall, the detail design, fabrication and testing stages of the 727's development were all conducted in a relatively orderly and predictable fashion, ensuring an on-budget completion. This was partly because not only had an extremely thorough preliminary design stage been conducted, based on the use of mostly proven technology, but also the overall development schedule contained realistic margin for coping with unexpected issues. My job was to design the deployment / retraction system for the outboard aft flap segment, the aerodynamic fairing for its actuator, and its structural attachment to the mid flap. I completed this assignment in mid 1962.
Soon after, I had the opportunity to participate in the development of the Apollo Spacecraft, designing the Lunar Module support and release system as well as the thrust structure for the Service Module's main engine. This program suffered from a very cursory preliminary design phase which even included that, at the time of the Apollo Program award, it had not yet been determined that a “Lunar Orbit Rendezvous” (LOR) approach would have to be used to reduce the overall Spacecraft weight so that the mission could be accomplished by the Saturn V launch vehicle.
As a result, the Spacecraft was designed in two blocks, with Block I being used for unmanned test flights, and Block II being manned. The differences between these block designs were considerable and expensive. But they were accommodated concurrently in such a way that the overall schedule was not seriously impacted. The concern that I was assigned to deal with was that the Block II Service Module required a 100% increase in stiffness, over that of the Block I design, in the main engine thrust structure / actuator loop. This was due to a dead-band limit in the control system, with engine firing when the Lunar Module was docked to the front of the Command Module, during trans-lunar injection. I was assigned to design a new thrust structure which would allow this doubling of stiffness without increasing the weight of the Service Module, which I successfully accomplished.
Despite such unexpected issues, including a tragic ground test fire in which three Astronauts were killed, the goal set by President Kennedy, to accomplish a manned Lunar landing before the end of the decade, was met in mid 1969. This was largely because the 8 year schedule, to first manned Lunar landing, that Kennedy had wisely mandated, inherently accommodated having to cope with major unforeseen problems. The Apollo development program, thus proved to be successful, and the following well-known operational program succeeded beyond all expectations.
Certain little known astute management decisions, which may have saved the Shuttle Program, were made by Prime Contractor and NASA management early in 1974, about two years after the Space Shuttle Orbiter Program was won by Rockwell International. Shortly after serving as Contractor Preliminary Design Review (PDR) Team Leader for the Orbiter Aft Fuselage, at which our preliminary design was approved by NASA, I was shown by the structural analysis supervisor on our team (Pierre “Pete” Dupaquier) that new design loads (including dynamic ones) were about to be surfaced that would, in key areas, exceed those that were driving, particularly, the current structural design of the Orbiter 101 aft fuselage thrust structure. This was a very complex and expensive design, which was one of the first composite (Titanium/ Boron Epoxy) reusable aerospace major primary structure applications.
I immediately scheduled a meeting with the Orbiter Program Chief Engineer (Ed Smith, who had served well in this position on the Apollo Program) . We briefed him in detail, causing him obvious dismay as he asked: “What am I going to tell the Program Manager (George Jeffs)?” Ed saw that we were trying to raise a key issue in time to do something about it before an even worse situation developed and he did not resort to denial or “shoot .the messengers.” We agreed that a meeting would be held as soon as possible to focus on trying to devise a plausible work-around. The problem to be addresses was how to demote “Enterprise” from orbital flight status to “Hanger Queen” without having to build a new orbiter to replace it, a cost impact that would probably end the Shuttle Program and besmirch the reputations of NASA and Rockwell.
The long established Orbiter Vehicle (OV) build schedule at that time was was:1) OV-101 (“Enterprise”); 2) STA-099 (Static test article, which was planned to be static strength tested to destruction); 3) MPTA-098 (Main Propulsion Test Article, consisting of an aft fuselage plus main engines (of about 400,000 lb sea level thrust each) plus a forward truss to simulate the orbiter mid and forward fuselages) for firing at Stennis Space Center; 4) OV-102 (“Columbia”); 5) 0V-103 (“Discovery”); OV-104 (“Atlantis”). Note that “Enterprise” was originally given a 100s number because it was indeed intended to be an orbital vehicle, and STA-099 was indeed intended to be static strength tested to destruction.
A few days later the work-around meeting was held and within less that an hour, as I recall, the problem was resolved. The meeting had barely started when the President of the Shuttle Orbiter Division (George Merrick) asked me why the STA needed to precede MPTA. I answered that, in my opinion, it didn't and this build sequence had only been implemented because a strong supervisor personality in the propulsion group had insisted that MPTA use the same structural design as STA for optimal test results. To me, it was far more important to design STA to withstand the latest loads, by interchanging it with MPTA in the schedule, plus we needed more time to reduce weight. This approach could be implemented by merely testing STS to design (limit) loads to insure that these could be reached without causing significant yielding (plastic strain). This would not only allow STA to be static strength and vibration-tested, but also, STA could be eventually turned into a flight orbiter, eliminating any need to build another entire orbiter from scratch to replace the structurally inadequate “Enterprise.”
Concurrently, a new aft fuselage could be built using the 101 design for MPTA ground testing. Since main engine full thrust cannot be reached at sea level with the throat / bell exit expansion ratio optimized for optimum specific impulse at vacuum conditions, only relatively slight modification of the 101 aft fuselage structure design, would likely be required. Also, Enterprise could still be used for approach and landing tests as well as facility checks before being relegated to museum status (where it currently resides at the Steven Udvar-Hazy Aerospace Museum).
We all seemed to realize that this strategy would be acceptable to NASA since it appeared to enable, overall, a win -win situation for both them and Rockwell. So, there were generally smiling faces as we left the meeting. I could hardly wait to tell my group the good news. Shortly thereafter I got an award from George Jeffs, but only after NASA had agreed with this overall strategy. Anyone who believes the claim that “Enterprise” was never intended to go to orbit, has not researched the original Shuttle Proposals. Incidentally, all one needs to do is peek inside “Enterprise's” aft fuselage and view the partly machined thrust structure cross-beams to which the dummy main engines are attached (if access can be obtained, which is doubtful).
To me, the bottom line is the lesson to be learned from this now documented ethical response to a technical crisis: addressing a technical crisis early and head-on is greatly preferable to denying it, especially incrementally, thus causing much greater financial and reputation loss
Posted by: Vincent A. Weldon | June 05, 2008 at 11:00 PM